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STEFAN A. RIESENFELD
SYMPOSIUM 2008
MARCH 14, 2008,
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
Keynote Address:
International Standard-Setting on the Human
Rights Responsibilities of Businesses
By
David Weissbrodt*
It is a great honor to be invited to my alma mater to speak at this confer-
ence highlighting the human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations
and to be selected to receive this year's Stefan A. Riesenfeld Award for my con-
tributions in the field of international law.
It is particularly appropriate that this conference relating to the human
rights obligations of transnational corporations is associated with Professor
Riesenfeld. The human rights community and I are personally indebted to Stefan
Riesenfeld for his contribution to the leading human rights precedent of Filir-
" David Weissbrodt is the Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. A world-renowned scholar in international human rights law, Pro-
fessor Weissbrodt became the first U.S. citizen since Eleanor Roosevelt to head a United Nations
human rights body when he served as the chairperson for the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights. Having been principally responsible for the United Nations'
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, Professor Weissbrodt offers unique insight into the role of law in shaping
transnational corporate conduct. Professor Weissbrodt is a graduate of Columbia University and UC
Berkeley, School of Law. The author thanks Kendall Bader for his assistance on this article. ©
2008 David Weissbrodt.
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tiga v. Pefia Irala.1 As a beginning law professor, I filed an amicus brief in that
case for Amnesty International. Much more influential, however, was Professor
Riesenfeld's brief for the U.S. State Department, which supported using the
Alien Torts Statute2 to bring human rights suits in U.S. courts. As a result of
Riesenfeld's groundbreaking brief and the resulting Fildrtiga decision, this stat-
ute is now being used to sue corporations for their human rights abuses.
3
This afternoon, I would like to contribute to our discussion by touching on
five subjects: First, why should there be international concern about corporate
social responsibility and human rights? Second, what international human rights
standards can be interpreted to apply to business? Third, what international stan-
dards apply directly to business? Fourth, what contributions do the U.N. Sub-
Commission Norms make to human rights standard-setting for business? And
fifth, what contribution is the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary-
General making and how will the Sub-Commission Norms fare in that context?
I.
WHY SHOULD THERE BE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS?
Efforts to promote corporate social responsibility acknowledge both the
positive and potentially negative consequences of business activity. Corpora-
tions are active in some of the most dynamic sectors of the national and world
economies. They bring new jobs, technology, and capital, and are capable of ex-
erting a positive influence on fostering development by improving living and
working conditions. At the same time, however, companies may abuse human
rights by employing child laborers, discriminating against certain groups of em-
ployees such as union members and women, attempting to repress independent
trade unions thereby discouraging the right to bargain collectively, failing to
provide safe and healthy working conditions, and limiting the broad dissemina-
tion of appropriate technology and intellectual property. These companies also
dump toxic wastes, and their production processes may have negative conse-
quences for the lives and livelihoods of neighboring communities.
Whether one perceives businesses as critical for the prosperity and eco-
nomic success of the community or focuses upon the problems they may cause,
there is certainly no doubt that companies are powerful forces in this beautiful
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort
Claims Act: Alternative Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial
Abuses, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 43 (2005); Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort
Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1 (2004).
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Bay Area, throughout this country, and around the world. The 300 largest corpo-
rations account for roughly one-quarter of the korld's productive assets. 4 For
example, one automobile company's sales in a single year are greater than the
gross national product of 178 countries, including Malaysia, Norway, Saudi
Arabia, and South Africa. 5 Transnational corporations (TNCs) hold ninety per-
cent of all technology and product patents worldwide 6 and are involved in sev-
enty percent of world trade.7 TNCs directly employ ninety million people (of
whom some twenty million live in developing countries) and produce twenty-
five percent of the world's gross product. The top 1,000 TNCs account for
eighty percent of the world's industrial output. 8 Not only are these companies
economically powerful, but they have the mobility and capacity to evade na-
tional laws and enforcement, because they can relocate or use their political and
economic clout to pressure governments to ignore corporate abuses.
9
International human rights standards, such as those promulgated by the
U.N., are increasingly important to achieving corporate social responsibility. 10
The need for such international standards is especially visible as the global
economy becomes more complex. 1 Considering the
ideology of profit maximization which subordinates all other considerations
to ... maximizing shareholder value[,] ... temptations exist in business organiza-
tions of all kinds ... to cut comers with regard to the environment, employees,
producers, communities, third-world nations, and other stakeholders impacted by
their policies and operations. 12
In the absence of clear international standards articulating the human rights ob-
ligations of individual businesses, it is likely that temptations of short-term
profit maximization may outweigh the benefits of socially responsible behavior.
4. MEDARD GABEL & HENRY BRUNER, GLOBAL INC.: AN ATLAS OF THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 5 (2003) (citing A Survey of Multinationals, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 9).
5. Id. at2.
6. "TNCs reportedly control 90% of the world's technology patents." Howard A. Kwon, Pat-
ent Protection and Technology Transfer in the Developing World: The Thailand Experience, 28
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 567, 570 n.13 (1995) (citing Suwanna Asavaroengchai, Seeking a
Fair Deal in Global Trade, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 19, 1994, at 31).
7. TOM ATHANASiOU, DIVIDED PLANET: THE ECOLOGY OF RICH AND POOR 194 (1996);
DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD 124 (1995).
8. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2001 at 9.
9. Claudio Grossman and Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-
Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 1, 8 (1993) ("The fact that they
have multiple production facilities means that [transnational corporations] can evade state power and
the constraints of national regulatory schemes by moving their operations between their different
facilities around the world.").
10. Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric Or Reality? Corporate Social Responsi-
bility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 207, 213 (2007).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Corporations themselves can benefit in a number of ways when they act in
a socially responsible manner. For example, a corporation might benefit by at-
tracting and retaining a higher-quality workforce, by increasing the job satisfac-
tion of its employees, by receiving an improved reputation among consumers,
and by protecting the value of its trademark and reputation.13 Although increas-
ing responsibility may not lead to an increase in short-term profits, TNCs may
benefit in the long run by staying ahead of new, stricter regulations and by at-
tracting investment from concerned investors. 14 Further, because of its global
nature, business can promote the protection of human rights because it possesses
"the capability to reach across borders and to get people who may not otherwise
work together to do so." 15 Business may be in the position to "damper fires
leading to violence simply by providing economic opportunity[,]" provided it
does so without "sow[ing] the seeds for resentment and violence." 16
11.
WHAT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS CAN BE INTERPRETED TO
APPLY TO BUSINESS?
Given their importance in the world, it is really remarkable that corpora-
tions have not received more attention for their contributions to the evolution of
international law and international human rights law in particular. International
law and human rights law have principally focused on protecting individuals
from violations by governments. There has been increasing attention, however,
devoted to individual responsibility for war crimes, genocide, and other crimes
against humanity, based on the Nuremberg tribunals in the 1940s,17 the criminal
tribunals established in the 1990s for the former Yugoslavia 1 8 and Rwanda, 19
and the International Criminal Court,20 which has now been accepted by 106
13. Erik Assadourian, The State of Corporate Responsibility and the Environment, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 571, 574 (2006).
14. Id. at 576.
15. Timothy L. Fort, Essay, The Times and Seasons of Corporate Responsibility, 44 AM. BUS.
L.J. 287, 322 (2007). See LISBETH SEGERLUND, MAKING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AN
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN: NORM CONSTRUCTION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 220-28 (2007).
16. Fort, supra note 15, at 323.
17. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
http://www I .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/imtl 945.htm.
18. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
19. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17,
1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002). The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction only over
natural persons (including corporate officers), but not over legal persons, such as corporations. Id.
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nations, although unfortunately not the United States. 2 1
Since businesses are comprised of individuals, these legal responsibilities
would apply to business people as well. For example, in the trials of Nazi lead-
ers following World War II, German industrialists were convicted of charges
relating, inter alia, to the use of slave labor and for designing and producing
poison gas used in the concentration camps of the Third Reich.22 Further, the
extension of legal responsibilities provides support for the application of interna-
tional human rights law not only to states, but also to non-state actors, including
individuals and businesses, as well as armed opposition groups.
Some human rights treaties and other law-making instruments may be
interpreted to apply to businesses. Most prominently, one can find a relevant
passage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 the primary non-treaty
instrument that in 1948 first established an authoritative, worldwide definition of
human rights. While the Universal Declaration principally focuses on the obliga-
tions of states, it also mentions the responsibilities of individuals and "every or-
gan of society," which includes businesses.
Human rights treaties also can be interpreted to apply indirectly to busi-
nesses. For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 24 a treaty that has been ratified by 160 nations including the United
States, each State party: "undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
Art. 25. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over
Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in
LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 143-45 (Menno T.
Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
21. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RATIFICATION/ACCESSION AND
SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE COURT (APIC), BY
REGION, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RatificationsbyUNGroup_ 14_mar-08-eng.pdf.
22. See United States of America v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,
"The Krupp Case," 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 (1950); United States of America v. Carl Krauch "The Farben Case," 8 Tri-
als of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10
(1952); Case no. 57, "the I.G. Farben Trial," US military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 Aug. 1947-29
July 1948, 10 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 (1952).
While the Farben organisation, as a corporation, is not charged under the indictment
with committing a crime and is not the subject of prosecution in this case, it is the the-
ory of the prosecution that the defendants individually and collectively used the Far-
ben organisation as an instrument by and through which they committed the crimes
enumerated in the indictment. All of the members of the Vorstand or governing body
of Farben who were such at the time of the collapse of Germany were indicted and
brought to trial.
8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1108 (1952).
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
2008]
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sent Covenant .... "25
Accordingly, if a corporation endangers the rights of an individual, the
State has a duty to ensure respect of human rights and thus to use due diligence
to take preventative action.
Some other U.N.-based treaties, such as the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, specify state
responsibility for the misconduct of any "persons, group or organization ' '26 or
even of "any person, organization or enterprise."
27
III.
WHAT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS APPLY DIRECTLY TO BUSINESS?
In addition to these treaty and non-treaty standards that focus principally on
governments and may be interpreted to apply, at least indirectly, to businesses,
the OECD, ILO, UN, Social Accountability International, and other organiza-
tions have directly addressed the responsibilities of companies. For example, in
1976 the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) established Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and updated them
in 2000 to promote responsible business conduct consistent with applicable
laws.28 However, the OECD Guidelines mentioned human rights only once in a
single paragraph. In 1977 the International Labor Organization (ILO) developed
its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises,
which calls upon'businesses to follow the relevant labor conventions and rec-
ommendations, and which were updated in 2006.29
Since the 1980s, concerns of civil society and an emerging concern of
companies themselves for social responsibility have led hundreds of companies
and several industry associations to adopt voluntary codes of conduct.3 ° This
number has increased as many corporations, including those that have been the
targets of protests and boycotts, have come to see the economic value inherent in
25. Id. Art. 2.
26. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
1, 1965, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978); 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Art. 2(l)(d).
27. Convention on .the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, Art. 2(c).
28. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976). The OECD updated these Guidelines in 2000. OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 2000, http://www.oecd.org/dataoccd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
29. International Labor Organization [hereinafter "ILO"], Tripartite Declaration of Principles
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, para. 6 (1978),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/declaration2006.pdf [hereinafter
"Tripartite Declaration"].
30. See Peter Frankental & Frances House, Human Rights: Is It Any of Your Business? 23
(2000).
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adopting socially responsible policies. 3 1 Some publicly spirited business organi-
zations, such as Social Accountability International, the International Business
Leaders Forum, and the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights have de-
veloped voluntary principles and educational activities, such as SA 8000, appli-
cable to a broad range of companies. SA 8000, for example, focuses principally
on the need for a safe and healthy work environment and other labor standards.
There are now 1,373 SA 8000 certified facilities.
3 2
In January 1998, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan proposed a "Global Compact" of shared values and princi-
ples. 33 The original Global Compact asked businesses to voluntarily support and
adopt nine very succinctly expressed core principles, which are divided into
categories dealing with general human rights obligations, standards of labor, and
standards of environmental protection. In 2004 the Global Compact added a
tenth core principle on corruption. 34 These principles represented increased at-
tention to the responsibilities of corporations in international law and interna-
tional economic relations. Some scholars have even argued that the Global
Compact reflects the increased influence of TNCs in international law making.
35
The new U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon endorsed the Global Compact a
few days after he took office in January 2007.
Several U.N.-based institutions have also adopted fragmentary corporate
responsibility standards, limiting their procurement to companies that protect,
for example, the environment (UNHCR), do not engage in child labor
(UNICEF), do not promote cigarettes (WHO), and do not engage in corrupt
business practices (World Bank). If these standards were adopted more consis-
tently, they could yield quite a powerful influence on corporate social responsi-
bility.
31. Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymme-
tries, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 728 (2006).
32. Social Accountability Accreditation Service, Certified Facilities List,
http://www.saasaccreditation.org/certfacilitieslist.htm.
33. Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6448 (Jan. 31, 1998).
34. The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.html. The principles are that
businesses should: (1) support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights
within their sphere of influence; (2) make sure they are not complicit in human right abuses; (3) up-
hold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (4)
eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labor; (5) abolish child labor; (6) eliminate discrimina-
tion in respect of employment and occupation; (7) support a precautionary approach to environ-
mental challenges; (8) undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; (9) en-
courage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies; and (10) work
against all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery.
35. See Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N. 's "Public-Private" Partnership
for Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 109 (2006).
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IV.
WHAT CONTRIBUTION DO THE U.N. SUB-COMMISSION NORMS MAKE TO HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARD-SETTING AS TO BUSINESS?
In August 2003, twenty-six human rights experts from twenty-six nations
around the globe who were then members of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights unanimously approved the Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights.36 The Sub-Commission Norms provide
that:
States have the primary responsibility to promote . . . and protect human rights
recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights. Within
their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and
other business enterprises have the obligation to promote.., and protect human
rights recognized in international as well as national law .... 37
This core provision of the Sub-Commission Norms addresses an issue that
not only was considered in preparing the Norms, but also arose in preparing the
ILO,3 8 OECD,39 and Global Compact4 ° guidelines, that is, whether these stan-
dards apply only to TNCs or to all businesses. On the one hand, most media at-
tention has focused on the activities and misdeeds of major corporations, such as
Blackwater, Enron, Parmalat, Union Carbide (Dow Chemical), and World-
com.4 1 Further, as I mentioned earlier, TNCs have the mobility and power to
evade national laws and enforcement because they can relocate or use their po-
litical and economic clout to pressure governments to ignore corporate abuses. 42
It was likely this sort of thinking which led the organizers of today's conference
to focus on transnational corporations. On the other hand, if one applies human
rights standards only to TNCs, such differential treatment could be considered
36. Sub-Comm'n on Prot. & Promotion of Human Rights, Working Group, Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) (Approved Aug. 13, 2003, by U.N. Sub-
Comm'n on Prot. & Promotion of Human Rights Res. 2003/16, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L. I Iat 52 (2003)).
37. Id. at para. 1.
38. Paragraph II of the ILO Tripartite Declaration provides that "[mlultinational and national
enterprises, wherever the principles of this Declaration are relevant to both, should be subject to the
same expectations in respect of their conduct in general and their social practices in particular." ILO,
Tripartite Declaration, supra note 29, at para. 11.
39. "Multinational and domestic enterprises arc subject to the same expectations in respect of
their conduct wherever the Guidelines are relevant to both." OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Revision 2000, supra note 28, at paras. 1-4 (emphasis omitted).
40. The Global Compact is aimed at "businesses," rather than multinational or domestic enter-
prises in particular. The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, supra note 34.
41. See Business & Human Rights Resource Center, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Home.
42. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 9, at 8 (1993).
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discriminatory. Further, it is not easy to define a transnational corporation and
there is a risk that sophisticated corporate lawyers, such as those trained here at
Berkeley Law, will be able to structure any business so as to avoid the applica-
tion of international standards designed only for TNCs.
Accordingly, the Sub-Commission Norms apply not only to TNCs but also
to national companies and local businesses in that each will be responsible ac-
cording to "their respective spheres of activity and influence." The U.N. Sub-
Commission Norms further apply to subsidiaries and suppliers. This approach
balances the need to address the power and responsibilities of TNCs and to level
the playing field of competition for all businesses, while not being too burden-
some on very small companies.
Although there is a very important educational value in voluntary company
codes, such policies can be posted on the Web one day and taken down the next.
They are often very vague with regard to human rights commitments and gener-
ally lack mechanisms for assuring continuity or implementation. For example,
only approximately 150 corporations have mentioned human rights in their re-
spective company codes.4 3 The Global Compact has been a great success in en-
couraging about 3,700 companies to join,44 but there remain about 67,000 other
transnational corporations which have not yet joined. Such voluntary initiatives
as SA 8000 and Valore Sociale in Italy play an extremely important role in en-
couraging corporate social responsibility for those companies that join and as to
which there is far more implementation and monitoring than the Global Com-
pact.
The U.N. Sub-Commission Norms, however, are still necessary to supple-
ment existing international standards because they apply to all companies-not
just those companies that agree to participate. It is also important to develop
standards that carry the imprimatur of the United Nations.
In addition, the Sub-Commission Norms have the most comprehensive ap-
proach to human rights, requiring TNCs and other business enterprises to re-
spect: the right to equality of opportunity and treatment; the right to security of
persons; the rights of workers, including a safe and healthy work environment
and the right to collective bargaining; international, national, and local laws and
the rule of law; a balanced approach to intellectual property rights and responsi-
bilities; transparency and avoidance of corruption; the right to health as well as
other economic, social, and cultural rights; other civil and political rights, such
as the freedom of movement; consumer protection; and environmental protec-
tion.
With respect to each of those subjects, the Sub-Commission Norms princi-
43. Business & Human Rights Resource Center, Companies with Human Rights Policies,
http://www.business-
humanrights.org/categories/companypolicysteps/policies/companieswithhumanrightspolicies.
44. United Nations Global Compact, Participants & Other Stakeholders,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html.
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pally reflect, restate, and refer to existing international standards, but apply them
not only to governments but directly to businesses. The Norms are consistent
with the progressive development of international law in applying standards not
only to states for which they were primarily drafted, but also to individuals,
armed opposition groups, and other non-state actors.
While they apply to all states and companies, the Sub-Commission Norms
are not legally binding but are similar to many other U.N. declarations, princi-
ples, guidelines, and standards that interpret existing law and summarize interna-
tional practice without reaching the status of a treaty. The Sub-Commission
Norms do, however, include some basic implementation procedures by: (1) an-
ticipating that companies will adopt their own internal rules of operation to as-
sure the protections set forth by the Norms; (2) indicating that businesses are
expected to assess their major activities in light of the Norms; (3) subjecting
companies' compliance with the Norms to independent and transparent monitor-
ing that includes input from relevant stakeholders; (4) calling for reparations or
other compensation in cases where the Norms have been violated; and (5) call-
ing upon governments to establish a framework of application of the Norms.
The Norms were transmitted to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights-
then the parent body of the Sub-Commission. The 2004 session of the Commis-
sion welcomed the Sub-Commission Norms and asked for a report from the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, but at the same time noted that the
document, as a draft before the Commission, did not on its own have any legal
status. Simultaneously, however, the Commission recognized for the first time
in its history that corporate social responsibility and human rights belong on the
human rights agenda of the United Nations.
V.
WHAT CONTRIBUTION IS THE U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL MAKING?
At its 2005 session, the Commission adopted a resolution 45 welcoming the
High Commissioner's report46 that in an extraordinarily balanced fashion identi-
fied precisely the same number of criticisms of the Sub-Commission Norms as it
found positive attributes. The Commission also called for the appointment by
the Secretary-General of a Special Representative on the issue of human rights
45. C.H.R. Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.I l/Add.7 at 70 (2005), was adopted April
20, 2005, by a vote of 49 in favor, 3 against (Australia, South Africa, and the United States), and I
abstaining (Burkino Faso). The United States called for a vote and explained its vote against the
resolution. U.S. Delegation to the Commission on Human Rights, http://www.humanrights-
usa.net/2005/0420Iteml 7TNC.htm.
46. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the responsibilities of
transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005).
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and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. (You might note
the similarity between the name of the norms and the title of the new post.) Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan appointed Professor John Ruggie, who had been the
principal drafter of the U.N. Global Compact, to serve as the Special Represen-
tative for "an initial period of two years," and then his mandate was extended for
one more year until this Spring 2008. The Special Representative of the Secre-
tary General (known as the SRSG) was expected, inter alia, to "identify and
clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights. ' 4 7
Meanwhile, the fifty-three member Commission on Human Rights has been
replaced by a new forty-seven member Human Rights Council, and the proce-
dural appendages (including thematic rapporteurs) of the Commission, such as
the SRSG, were transferred to the Council that was elected in May 2006 and had
its first meeting in June. The new Council has had a lot to do in establishing its
procedures, organizing itself, and replacing the twenty-six member Sub-
Commission with a new eighteen-member Advisory Committee. Thus, the
Council is devoting some time to begin handling substantive matters such as the
human rights responsibilities of business. The SRSG has however produced sev-
eral initial reports 4 8 as well as an October 2007 article in the American Journal
of International Law.49
Although in his first interim report the SRSG noted the Sub-Commission
Norms and made a positive and generally balanced contribution to the interna-
tional understanding of the relationship between human rights and business,50
the SRSG in his 2007 article stated that the "business community, represented
by the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organization
of Employers, was firmly opposed."'5 1 In drafting the Norms, the Sub-
Commission did reach out to, and received some input from individual compa-
nies and the international business community, including the organizations men-
tioned in the SRSG's article. Certainly, input from the business community is
47. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on Prot. & Promotion of Human Rights, Interim report of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational cor-
porations and other business enterprises, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006). See also U.N
Human Rights Council, Business and human rights: mapping international standards of responsibil-
ity and accountability for corporate acts, A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) & add. 1-4 (prepared by John
Ruggie); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises:
Human rights impact assessments-resolving key methodological questions, A/HRC/4/74 (Feb. 5,
2007).
48. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006). See also A/HRC/4/35 (2007) & add. 1-4; A/HRC/4/74
(2007).
49. John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,
101 A.J.I.L. 819 (2007).
50. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2006/97, supra note 48. See Michael Wright & Amy Lehr, Business
Recognition of Human Rights: Global Patterns, Regional and Sectoral Variations (2006).
51. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 821.
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helpful, since their contributions would make it more likely that international
standards will influence their actions. 52 It is not surprising, however, that these
organizations representing large corporations have been more cooperative with
the SRSG as he raised criticisms of the Sub-Commission Norms. These interna-
tional business organizations-reflecting the most hard-line big corporate per-
spective-oppose any standards that are not voluntary. The International Cham-
ber of Commerce initially even opposed the idea of the voluntary Global
Compact.
The SRSG also argued that the Sub-Commission Norms "embodied
sources of conceptual as well as factual confusion, with potentially deleterious
consequences for the realization of human rights." 53 The SRSG's criticisms re-
flect a misunderstanding of the role of soft law principles in international law as
distinguished from treaties.
According to the SRSG, although the Sub-Commission Norms enumerated
rights that are particularly relevant to business, the list of rights also included
many that "states have not recognized or are still debating at the global level."
54
In fact, the Norms summarize the principles of international human rights law
relevant to each paragraph. For example, paragraphs three and four of the Norms
summarize the principles of humanitarian law relevant to corporations, stating:
3. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not engage
in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, extrajudi-
cial, summary or arbitrary executions, or other violations of humanitarian law
and other international crimes against the human person as defined by inter-
national law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law.
4. Security arrangements for transnational corporations and other business en-
terprises shall observe international human rights norms as well as the laws
and professional standards of the country or countries in which they oper-
ate.55
Those two provisions derive most prominently from the Geneva Conven-
tions,56 the Statute of the International Criminal Court,57 the Code of Conduct
52. Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 800 (2007).
53. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 822.
54. Id. at 825.
55. Norms, supra, note 36, paras. 3-4.
56. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 12 (2), U.N. Doc.
32/A/CONF, 183/9.
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for Law Enforcement Officials, 58 and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 59 which in turn have been applied
to oil, mining, and other extractive industry companies in the Voluntary Princi-
ples on Security and Human Rights. 60 SRSG Ruggie's concern seems to rely on
a contention initially presented by the International Chamber of Commerce 61 in
which he argued that:
In several instances, and with no justification, the Norms end up imposing
higher obligations on corporations than states, by including as standards
binding on corporations instruments that not all states have ratified or
have ratified conditionally, and even some for which states have adopted
no international instruments at all. 62
The Sub-Commission Norms, of course, do not constitute a treaty and
therefore cannot bind either states or corporations in the same way that treaties
are binding once they are ratified. If, however, one wanted to identify the hu-
manitarian law principles most applicable to both state and non-state actors, the
Geneva Conventions, the ICC Statute, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforce-
ment Officials, the Basic Principles on Firearms, and the Voluntary Security
Principles are the most relevant. United Nations drafters regularly follow this
approach of borrowing provisions from one instrument to develop another. 63
This approach to borrowing language is not at all uncommon. It should also be
noted that the Sub-Commission carefully consulted the International Committee
of the Red Cross to make sure that these provisions of the Norms were consis-
tent with humanitarian law.
Further, the Norms clearly declare in the first paragraph that states, not cor-
porations, have the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights.
If one were to take the SRSG/International Chamber of Commerce argument
seriously and insist on universal ratification of every provision, it would disal-
58. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. res. 34/169, annex, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 46) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
59. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Eighth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27
August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990).
60. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, December 20, 2000.
61. See International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers,
Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (2003); http://www.reports-and-materials.org/IOE-ICC-
views-UN-norms-March-2004.doc.
62. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, para. 66 (2006).
63. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, JOAN FITZPATRICK, & FRANK
NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS (forthcoming 4th ed.)
(manuscript, chapter 2 at 4, on file with author) (noting that treaty language generally "has a long
pedigree as it is usually adopted or at least heavily relied upon in future instruments. Its long-term
use ideally strengthens the effect of and understanding about what the provisions are designed to
accomplish").
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low the development of any non-treaty instrument on this or any other subject. It
would have even made it impossible to draft and get approved the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The SRSG also argues that the Sub-Commission Norms could "undermine
corporate autonomy, risk taking, and entrepreneurship." 64 SRSG Ruggie be-
lieves that TNCs should be forced to assume the obligations of the government
only when they perform state functions. 65 Since states are afforded a certain
amount of discretion in meeting their human rights obligations, imposing on
TNCs the "full range of duties ... directly under international law by definition
reduces the discretionary space" allowed in pursuit of human rights norms.66
Additionally, the SRSG says that shifting the human rights burdens of weak
governments onto private corporations would "undermine domestic political in-
centives to make governments more responsive and responsible to their own
citizenry." 6
7
In fact, the Sub-Commission Norms are meant to strengthen the hands of
governments by giving them clear standards to which they can refer in dealing
with powerful corporations. As a result, all governments, weak and strong, will
be better able to protect their residents from the abuses of non-state actors, such
as businesses. Businesses will also benefit from the leveling of the competitive
playing field provided by the Sub-Commission Norms.
As I mentioned earlier, paragraph one of the Sub-Commission Norms,
places secondary responsibility on corporations, stating:
Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corpora-
tions and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote ... and pro-
tect human rights recognized in international as well as national law.68
The SRSG has criticized the concept of "spheres of influence" because it
has "no legal pedigree," and the distinction between primary and secondary du-
ties was not elaborated upon by the Sub-Commission Norms. 69 It is ironic that
Ruggie attacks the concept of "spheres of influence" 70 because it derives from
the Global Compact which he drafted for the U.N. Secretary-General. The Sub-
Commission Norms do add "spheres of activity and influence," so as to take into
account not only the external impact of businesses on surrounding communities,
suppliers, and customers, but also the consequences upon the health and safety
of employees.
64. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 826 (citing Philip Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the
International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-state Actors? in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 14 (Philip Alston ed., 2005)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Norms, supra note 36, para. 1.
69. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, supra note 48, para. 67.
70. See supra note 34.
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The SRSG noted that TNCs generally are organized in networks, which re-
sults in the divestment of a certain amount of direct control. 7 1 These networks,
which consist of parent corporations, subsidiaries, and suppliers, operate in nu-
merous countries, and as the size of the network grows, they become more diffi-
cult for the parent to monitor. 72 Generally the purchase of goods from a supplier
is considered an arm's-length exchange, and even a parent and its subsidiary are
considered to be distinct legal entities. Each separate entity in a large network is
governed by the laws of the countries in which it operates, but the SRSG argues
that the TNC as a network is not governed by international law. The move to es-
tablish global legal standards to govern TNCs, SRSG Ruggie states, seeks to al-
ter this "foundational fact."
73
This criticism of the Sub-Commission Norms seems to ignore the tremen-
dous diversity in power that some companies, such as Microsoft and Wal-Mart,
can wield over their suppliers and business partners. Also, the SRSG fails to
note that the Norms apply to all businesses whether they are transnational corpo-
rations, suppliers, customers, or other business enterprises. The Norms require a
company to inquire into the conduct of the companies with which it does busi-
ness, but not further up or down the supply chain, except to the extent of their
influence. As the Commentary to the Norms explains with regard to the primary
and secondary influence of businesses:
The obligation of transnational corporations and other business enterprises under
these Norms applies equally to activities occurring in the home country ... of the
transnational corporation or other business enterprise, and in any country in
which the business is engaged in activities ....
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises using or considering
entering into business relationships with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers,..
. or natural or other legal persons that do not comply with the Norms shall ini-
tially work with them to reform or decrease violations, but if they will not change,
the enterprise shall cease doing business with them. 74
Further, SRSG Ruggie argues that the international legal principles ex-
pressed in the Sub-Commission Norms diverged from the "actual state of inter-
national law regarding business and human rights." 75 The SRSG specifically
discussed differences relating to: the duty of states to protect against third-party
abuses of rights; 76 the growing potential of businesses to be held liable for inter-
national crimes; 77 a norm of customary international law establishing direct cor-
71. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 823.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 824.
74. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion &
Prot. of Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, paras. 1, 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
75. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 827.
76. Id. at 828.
77. Id. at 830.
2008]
388 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
porate responsibility for human rights abuses; 78 and "an expanding universe of
self-regulation in the business and human rights domain."79
The Sub-Commission Norms represent an effort to develop a restatement of
international human rights and related principles with regard to business. They
are the most comprehensive of such standards that currently exist. SRSG Ruggie
has criticized the Norms' characterization as a restatement, noting that its legal
principles were "contested by business and . . . academic observers." 80 The
SRSG cites the International Chamber of Commerce and two academics for this
proposition while ignoring the dozens of favorable academic comments the
Norms have received by legal and other academic scholars. 8 1 Indeed, when the
Sub-Commission Norms were submitted for review by the German Government
to the highly respected Max Planck Institute, the Norms were found to be con-
sistent with the prevailing trends of international law.82 They were vetted by the
relevant international institutions, for example, the International Committee of
the Red Cross as to humanitarian law and the ILO as to labor standards. Addi-
tionally, Ruggie seemed to be unaware that restatements do not merely describe
the law "as it presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a court[,]" 83 but
they have served to achieve progressive reform in the law.
In his discussion on the current state of international law regarding TNCs
and human rights, the SRSG favorably mentions several soft law initiatives in-
cluding the Global Compact,84 the ILO, the OECD, the Fair Labor Associa-
tion,85 the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 86 the Kimberly Process
78. Id. at 832.
79. Id. at 835.
80. Id. at 827.
81. See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, Corporations and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 195 (2006); David Kinley, The Politics of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 25
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 30 (2007); David Kinley, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations:
The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447 (2006); Tarek F.
Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assess-
ment, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135 (2007); Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global Compact and Ac-
countability of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1
(2007).
82. Letter from Ridiger Wolfrum, Co-Director, Max Planck Institute to Christian Lindemann
(Nov. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
83. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 827 (quoting American Law Institute, Projects Overview, avail-
able at http://www.ali.org/index.cfmfuseaction~projects-main). Just as with regard to the American
Law Institute's restatements there is a tension in the Sub-Commission Norms between passive re-
statement and progressive reform. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories:
Wisconsin and the American Lav Institute The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1995); John
P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615 (1998).
84. UN Global Compact Home Page, http://www.unglobalcompact.org.
85. Fair Labor Association, Charter Document (2007), available at
http://www.fairlabor.org/docs/CharterFeb07.pdf.
86. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Home Page, http://eitransparency.org.
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Certification Scheme, 87 the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
and the Equator Principles,88 but did not mention SA 8000 until the supplemen-
tal report of December 2006. The SRSG concludes, however, that "[a]lthough
each has weaknesses that require improvement, the relative ease and speed with
which such arrangements can be established, and the flexibility with which they
can operate, make them an important complement to the traditional state-based
treaty-making and soft law standard-setting process."
89
I agree in this respect with the SRSG and I would add that like the Sub-
Commission Norms, the Global Compact, the Kimberly Certification Scheme
for avoiding blood diamonds, and the other initiatives mentioned by the SRSG
have promulgated soft law instruments. Unlike the Sub-Commission Norms,
however, the other soft law instruments are voluntary and not universal in appli-
cation or substance. Further, these other initiatives generally lack effective im-
plementation measures. The Sub-Commission Norms apply to all businesses to
the extent of their activities and influence, and since no opt-in is required, no
one may opt out. Further, the Norms represent the most comprehensive collec-
tion of standards applicable to all businesses, providing more detailed explica-
tion of the brief phrases in the Global Compact, and extending those principles
into other areas like consumer rights, for example. The Sub-Commission Norms
also recommend implementation measures not found in most of the other volun-
tary soft law standards.
The SRSG concluded his report by enumerating a number of guiding prin-
ciples that bear specifically on the role of voluntary standards acceptable to the
big business community. First, any strategy addressing the human rights respon-
sibilities of businesses "needs to strengthen and build out from the existing ca-
pacity of states and the states system to regulate and adjudicate harmful actions
by corporations, not undermine it." 90 Second, "the focal point in the business
and human rights debate needs to expand beyond establishing individual corpo-
rate liability for wrongdoing." 9 1 To this end, soft law arrangements such as the
Kimberly Process represent an "important innovation" because they attempt to
create a process that is focused on prevention rather than assignment of liabil-
ity. 92 Finally, SRSG Ruggie notes that "any successful regime needs to moti-
vate, activate, and benefit from all of the moral, social, and economic rationales
that can affect the behavior of corporations," and should provide "incentives as
well as punishments, identify[] opportunities as well as risks, and build[] social
movements and political coalitions that involve representation from all the rele-
87. Kimberley Process Home Page, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.
88. The Equator Principles Home Page, http://www.equator-principles.com.
89. Ruggie, supra note 49, at 835.
90. Id. at 838
91. Id. at 839.
92. Id.
2008]
390 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
vant sectors of society."
93
Beyond the voluntary human rights principles that the SRSG prefers, how-
ever, there is a tremendous demand in civil society for a comprehensive set of
standards governing the conduct of international business, which go beyond
voluntary codes of conduct like the Global Compact. For example, in November
2007 an open letter, signed by over 200 civil society groups around the world,
was sent to SRSG Ruggie, expressing the need to develop international stan-
dards as to the conduct of international businesses. 94 Further, the broad dissatis-
faction of the NGO human rights community extends not only to his failure to
develop standards, but also to his failure to follow the approach of other U.N.
thematic procedures in highlighting human rights abuses by the business com-
munity.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Sub-Commission Norms have revived the global discus-
sion on the need for international human rights standards for businesses. They
have set forth the most comprehensive collection of international standards and
implementation mechanisms, which sets the current high watermark for such
efforts. It is most likely that significant progress will be made in developing
standards when there is another major incident like the disastrous chemical spill
at Bhopal that will make evident the need for standards like the Norms. In the
meantime, some companies, such as a large mobile phone company, are using
the Sub-commission Norms as a contract requirement for suppliers and subcon-
tractors. Some nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International,
are using the Norms and/or their content as a basis for assessing the conduct of
businesses. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was supposed
to develop standards, but has instead attempted to derail the standard-setting
process and bow to the corporate refusal to accept any standards except volun-
tary codes.
I am pleased to have been part of this process and am very happy to report
that many others are continuing this, as-yet incomplete, work. Indeed, while I
am honored to receive the Stefan A. Riesenfeld Award today for my contribu-
tions to international law, I believe that my work as to the human rights respon-
sibilities of businesses is still incomplete. Of course, Professor Riesenfeld was
blessed by ninety useful years to make his many contributions, so this award
may be an indication that I have some more time. Meanwhile, I encourage all of
93. Id. at 839-40.
94. Available at http://www.escr-net.org/usrdoc/OpenLetterRuggieFinalEndorsements.pdf.
See also, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice & Human Rights Watch, On the Margins of
Profit: Rights at Risk in the Global Economy 1, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/bhr0208/bhr0208webwcover.pdf.
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you to get involved in this effort to hold businesses responsible for their interna-
tional human rights obligations.
